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PAWNSHOPS, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, AND SELF-REGULATION 
 
SUSAN PAYNE CARTER* AND PAIGE MARTA SKIBA** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Pawnbroking is the oldest source of credit.1 There is growing 
public interest in day-to-day pawnbroking operations, as evidenced 
by the popularity of reality shows such as “Pawn Stars” and 
“Hardcore Pawn.”2 Television viewers’ curiosity about an old credit 
institution may be due to the fact that 7% of all U.S. households have 
used pawn credit.3 Although pawnshops predate biblical times, 
researchers know surprisingly little about this ancient form of 
banking and its customers.4 We fill this gap by documenting detailed 
information on pawnshop loan repayment and default, and by 
discussing how pawnshop borrowers’ behavior is consistent with 
various behavioral economics phenomena. 
Pawnshop loans are small, short-term, collateralized loans 
typically used by low-income consumers. The borrower leaves a 
possession, or “pledge,” as collateral in exchange for a loan, 
typically of $75–$100.5 Interest rates vary by state and range from 2 
                                                            
* Assistant Professor, Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, United 
States Military Academy. susan.carter@usma.edu. The views expressed in 
this paper do not necessarily represent those of the United States Military 
Academy, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
paige.skiba@vanderbilt.edu. 
We would like to thank Margaret Blair, Anna Skiba-Crafts and Kip Viscusi 
for valuable feedback. 
1 JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK CASHING OUTLETS, 
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 13 (1994). 
2 Pawn Stars, THE HISTORY CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/shows/ 
pawn-stars (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); Hardcore Pawn, TRUTV, 
http://www.trutv.com/shows/hardcore-pawn/index.html (last visited Nov. 
19, 2012). 
3 Marieke Bos, Susan Payne Carter & Paige Marta Skiba, The Pawn 
Industry and its Customers: The United States and Europe 1 (Vanderbilt 
Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12–26, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2149575. 
4 Id. 
5 Customers can also sell items outright to the pawnshop, a practice we do 
not study here. 
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to 25%.6 If the borrower does not return to repay the principal plus 
interest after the maturation date (typically loans last 30–90 days), 
the pledge is forfeited and resold by the pawnbroker. Just about 
anyone can borrow on a pawn loan. No bank account, job, or credit 
check is required—just the collateral and a valid photo ID. 
We are able to study pawnshop-borrowing behavior in depth 
using a unique transaction dataset from a lender in Texas with 103 
stores in 37 different cities across the state. Our dataset comes from 
“pawnslips,” which are filled out by the pawnbroker at the time of 
the transaction and include information on the collateral or “pledge,” 
start date and due date, repayment outcomes, and borrower 
demographic characteristics. We study the nature of the 
collateralized pledge separately, distinguishing items that might have 
intrinsic value to the owner that goes beyond the dollar value of the 
item, i.e., sentimental value. We find that borrowers are more likely 
to return to repay their pawnshop loan when they have pawned a 
sentimental item, such as a piece of jewelry. We discuss potential 
behavioral economic explanations and rational economic reasons for 
this behavior below. 
These issues have gone unexplored in the sparse literature on 
pawnshop lending. The growing body of work on other forms of 
what is often referred to as “fringe banking” makes the persistent 
lack of literature on pawnshops especially surprising.7 Numerous 
papers study consumer borrowing behavior and test the 
consequences of various other types of subprime credit, including 
payday loans, subprime mortgages, subprime auto loans, and auto-
title loans.8 Perhaps researchers have overlooked pawnshop lending 
                                                            
6 Our Table 1 shows these interest rates. For a state-level analysis of 
pawnbroking as well as payday loans, see generally Susan Payne Carter, 
Payday Loan and Pawnshop Usage: The Impact of Allowing Payday Loan 
Rollovers (Jan. 15. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt 
Univ.), available at https://my.vanderbilt.edu/susancarter/files/2011/07/ 
Carter_Susan_JMP_website2.pdf. 
7 For a nice exception that studies pawnbroking (rather than customer 
behavior per se) see CASKEY, supra note 1. For works that study pawnshop 
customers directly, see Bos, Carter & Skiba, supra note 3; Sumit Agarwal, 
Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans and Credit Cards: 
New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 412 (2009). 
8 On payday loans see generally Agarwal, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 7, 
at 412; Neil Bhutta, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loan 
Choices and Consequences 1–23 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law and Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12–30, 2012), available at 
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because the loans made are small (the average loan size in our data is 
$79). Despite their small principal, however, pawnshop loans are an 
important tool that many consumers use to manage their monthly 
finances during financial shortfalls. 
Our results documenting differential repayment rates on 
pawn contracts are consistent with both (1) a model of decision-
making where consumers are aware of their own self-control 
problems and (2) a rational model of economic decision-making 
where “affect” or sentimentality toward an object plays a role in 
utility maximization. As explained infra, loss aversion, the extra loss 
in utility due to the feeling of loss relative to a reference point, 9 may 
also play a role. 
Because of self-awareness about self-control problems, 
borrowers may seek commitment mechanisms to give themselves a 
greater incentive to act optimally. In the context of pawnshops, these 
                                                                                                                              
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2160947; Carter, supra 
note 6; Susan Payne Carter, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, 
Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing by Credit Union Members, in 
FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 145, 147 (Olivia S. Mitchell ed., 2011); Will 
Dobbie & Paige Marta Skiba, Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit 
Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending 1–41 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law and 
Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-05, Sept. 15, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1742564##; Ronald J. 
Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857 
(2007); Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from 
the Payday Lending Market, 126 Q. J. OF ECON. 517, 518 (2011); Paige 
Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 1 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-13, 
Feb. 23, 2011). On mortgages, see generally J. Michael Collins, Exploring 
the Design of Financial Counseling for Mortgage Borrowers in Default, 28 
J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 207 (2007); J. Michael Collins, Ken Lam & Chris 
Herbert, State Mortgage Foreclosure Policies and Counseling 
Interventions: Impacts on Borrower Behavior in Default, 30 J. OF POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 216 (2011). On subprime auto loans, see generally 
William Adams, Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Liquidity Constraints and 
Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending, 99 AMER. ECON. REV. 49 
(2009). On auto-title lending, see generally Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, 
69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012). 
9 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 193, 194 (1991).  
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types of borrowers, called “hyperbolic discounters”10 by behavioral 
economists, may use sentimental items (such as wedding rings) 
rather than less sentimental items (such as electronics) to encourage 
themselves to return to repay the loan. Indeed, pawnshops accept 
almost anything of at least a couple dollars in value as a pledge, but 
many borrowers choose to pledge something of great importance to 
them. 
A growing body of work in behavioral economics documents 
real-world evidence of hyperbolic discounting. To our knowledge, 
ours is the first work to add pawnshops to the ongoing discussion of 
intertemporal choice in markets.11  
 
                                                            
10 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q. 
J. OF ECON. 121, 125 n.5 (2001) (explaining that the term “hyperbolic 
discounting” is often used to describe how “a person’s relative preference 
for well-being at an earlier date over a later date gets stronger as the earlier 
date gets closer,” i.e., how people seek immediate gratification). 
11 Professors DellaVigna and Malmendier document self-control problems 
in exercising. See Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to 
Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694, 695–96 (2006). For more recent 
work documenting self-control problems, see generally Heather Royer, 
Mark Stehr & Justin Sydnor, Using Incentives and Commitments to 
Overcome Self-Control Problems: Evidence from a Workplace Field 
Experiment (Oct. 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://experiments.cob.calpoly.edu/seminars/Royer.pdf. For work on self-
control problems in credit markets, see generally David Laibson, Andrea 
Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, Estimating Discount Functions with 
Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13314, Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13314. On credit cards, see generally Haiyan 
Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card 
Market (Jan. 30, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/time-inconsistency-credit-card-
market.pdf. On payday loans, see generally Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy 
Tobacman, Paydays Loans, Uncertainty and Discounting: Explaining 
Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default (Vanderbilt Law and Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-33, Aug. 21, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319751. 
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II.  Regulation 
 
Pawnshops are popularly considered to have usurious 
interest rates, but their fees are often low relative to those associated 
with alternatives such as payday loans,12 tax refund anticipation 
loans,13 and rent-to-own agreements.14 All states allow pawnshops, 
and most do restrict the fees that can be charged through usury laws 
or laws regulating small loans.15 Table 1 provides a list of laws 
governing pawnshop interest rates by state. Beyond regulating fees, 
states can also force pawnshops to return any excess proceeds to the 
customer once they resell an item.16 In Texas, where our data are 
from, maximum interest rates are 20% per thirty days for loans up to 
$150 and 15% per thirty days for loans larger than $200.17 
  
                                                            
12 Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 11, at 20 (documenting annualized 
interest rates for two-week-long payday loans of 468%). 
13 Gregory Elliehausen, Consumer Use of Tax Refund Anticipation Loans 2 
(Georgetown Univ. McDonough Sch. of Bus. Credit Research Center, 
Monograph No. 37, Apr. 2005) (illustrating annualized interest rates for ten 
day loans as high as 162.43%). 
14 Michael H. Anderson & Sanjiv Jaggia, Rent-to-Own Agreements: 
Customer Characteristics and Contract Outcomes, 61 J. OF ECON. & BUS. 
51, 52 (2009) (referencing interest rates on such loans higher than 100%). 
15Joshua D. Shackman & Glen Tenney, The Effects of Gov’t Regulations on 
the Supply of Pawn Loans: Evidence from 51 Jurisdictions in the U.S., 30 J. 
OF FIN. SERV. RESEARCH 69, 81 (2006); Nancy PINDUS, DANIEL KUEHN & 
RACHEL BRASH, URBAN INST., STATE RESTRICTIONS ON SMALL-DOLLAR 
LOANS AND FIN. SERVS. 2004–2009: SUMMARY, DOCUMENTATION, AND 
DATA 1 (Urban Inst., Oct. 2010), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
publications/412305.html (showing that forty states set interest rate caps on 
pawnshop loans). 
16 This process rarely happens in practice. But see Shackman & Tenney, 
supra note 15, at 81 (listing states that have enacted such requirements). 
17 Texas Pawnshop Rate Chart, TEX. OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
COMM’R, http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/int_rates/pRate13.pdf (last 
visited November 20, 2012) (listing maximum legal rates from July 1, 2012 
to June 30, 2013). 
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Table 1 
Pawnshop Interest Rate Regulations 
State Interest Rates Per Month 
Alabama 25% / mo 
Alaska 20% / mo 
Arizona 8% / mo 
Arkansas none 
California 2.5% / mo 
Colorado local rules 
Connecticut 3% / mo 
DC 5% / mo 
Delaware 3% / mo 
Florida 25% / mo 
Georgia 25% / mo 
Hawaii 20% / mo 
Idaho none 
Illinois 3% / mo 
Indiana 3% / mo 
Iowa none 
Kansas 10% / mo 
Kentucky 2% / mo 
Louisiana 10% / mo 
Maine 25% / mo 
Maryland none 
Massachusetts 3% / mo 
Michigan 3% / mo 
Minnesota 3% / mo 
Mississippi 25% / mo 
Missouri 2% / mo 
Montana 25% / mo 
Nebraska none 
Nevada 10% / mo 
New Hampshire none 
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New Jersey 4% / mo 
New Mexico max{7.50, 10%} 
New York 4% / mo 
North Carolina 2% / mo 
North Dakota reg. by municipalities 
Ohio 5% / mo 
Oklahoma 20% / mo 
Oregon 3% / mo 
Pennsylvania 2.5% / mo 
Rhode Island 5% / mo 
South Carolina $22.50/$100 / mo 
South Dakota none 
Tennessee 2% / mo 
Texas $20 / mo 
Utah 10% / mo 
Vermont 3% / mo 
Virginia 5% / mo 
Washington 3% / mo 
West Virginia none 
Wisconsin 3% / mo 
Wyoming 20% / mo 
Table 1 shows pawnshop laws by state as of 2011. 
The state laws on pawn shops come from individual 
state regulating insitutions. 
 
Beyond these fairly standard regulations, however, 
pawnshops have received little attention from regulators in recent 
years. This is in stark contrast to other forms of prime and subprime 
credit such as credit cards, student loans, and payday loans, which 
have been explicitly identified by the new Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) as areas of interest.18 Pawnshops, 
however, do not seem to be on the CFPB’s radar.19 
                                                            
18 See Know Before You Owe: Credit Cards, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/knowbeforeyouowe 
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The relative lack of regulatory attention given to pawnshops 
may be due to the phenomenon we document in this paper: 
consumers seem to avoid making big financial mistakes when using 
pawnshops. Something about the use of personal items (and 
particularly sentimental personal items) as collateral may distinguish 
these loans from credit cards, payday loans, and the like in terms of 
borrowers’ repayment and default behavior. 
 
III.  Data 
 
 We use administrative records from a large, national 
pawnshop lender in the United States. Our data consist of 398,722 
pawnslips from stores that operated in Texas from 1997–2002. From 
these slips, we can observe the size of the loan, whether the loan was 
defaulted on or repaid, and the nature of the pledge. The store 
categorizes the items into the following groups: Jewelry, 
TVs/Electronics, Tools/Equipment, Household Items, Sporting 
Equipment, Guns, Instruments, and Cameras/Equipment.20 While our 
dataset is large and very detailed, one drawback is that it comes from 
Texas alone. Fortunately, we are able to rely on previous work 
documenting the surprisingly similar characteristics of pawnshop use 
across the United States as well as Sweden.21 Figure 1 and Table 2 
provide basic summary statistics from our data. The typical loan is 
for $79 and lasts for 109 days. 
 
                                                                                                                              
(last visited Nov. 25, 2012); Know Before You Owe: Student Loans, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
students/knowbeforeyouowe (last visited Nov. 25, 2012); Zixta Q. 
Martinez, Share Your Input on Payday Loans for the Official Record, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www. 
consumerfinance.gov/blog/category/payday-loans/. 
19 There is no mention of “pawnshops” on the CFPB website. See 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
20 Pawnshops and other lenders now commonly offer “title loans,” with an 
automobile as a pledge. We do not have automobiles as pledges in our data. 
For more on title lending, see generally Hawkins, supra note 8; Nathalie 
Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and 
Demographic Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41 (2012) 
(discussing demographic trends in auto-title lending). 
21 Bos, Carter & Skiba, supra note 3, at 2. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
All Loans  
Percent Female 59.59% 
Average Loan Duration 109 
 (140.2) 
Average Loan Amount 79.5 
 (90.8) 
  
Table 2 shows the percent of pawn loans taken out 
by females, the average and standard deviation (in 
parentheses) of the loan duration and loan amount. 
The sample of observations is from a pawnshop 
lender in Texas between 1997 and 2002.  
 
Forty-nine percent of the pawnshop loans in the dataset are 
collateralized with jewelry, with over half of the items in the jewelry 
category consisting of rings, including both men’s and women’s 
class and wedding rings. The next most popular category of pledges 
is televisions and electronics, including satellite dishes, stereos, and 
CD players. Individuals also commonly pawn tools, household items 
such as small appliances, sporting equipment, guns, musical 
instruments, and camera equipment. 
The value of collateral has a wide distribution: Guns have 
the highest average value, $146, with instruments ($117) and jewelry 
($96) coming in second and third, respectively. Statistics for all 
categories are shown in Table 3.    
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Table 3: Collateral by Category 
Category Number of 
Observations 
Percentage of 
Observations 
Average 
Loan 
Amount 
Standard 
Deviation 
Jewelry 199,288 49.98% $96.28  105.02 
TVs / 
Electronics 
126,297 31.68% $58.80  62.34 
Tools / 
Equipment 
31,600 7.93% $50.18  60.67 
Household 
Items 
10552 2.65% $42.92  44.7 
Missing 7,833 1.96% $63.75  72.54 
Guns 7,734 1.94% $146.97  98.75 
Instruments 7,700 1.93% $116.92  104.66 
Camera / 
Equipment 
4,052 1.02% $75.85  77.87 
Misc. 3,666 0.92% $51.50  62.46 
Table 3 reports the number of loans for each collateral category, the 
percentage of observations, and the average amount and standard 
deviation of the items pawned for each category. All amounts are in 2002 
dollars. The sample of observations is from a pawnshop lender in Texas 
between 1997 and 2002.  
 
 The items pawned differ somewhat by the gender of the 
borrower. Jewelry is the most popular pledge for women, making up 
over 60% of the items pawned by women. Meanwhile, less than 35% 
of the items pawned by men are jewelry; men are more likely than 
women to pawn electronics and tools. 
 
IV.  Default 
 
The probability of repayment varies by the type of collateral, 
the gender of the borrower, and the value of the item. Figure 2 
depicts the probability of repayment and default by the category of 
collateral. Instruments, guns, and jewelry are associated with the 
highest probability of repayment and lowest probability of default. 
The pawning of tools, household items, and miscellaneous items 
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(including clothes and medical equipment) leads to the highest 
probability of default and lowest probability of repayment.22 
We explore default dynamics more precisely using an 
ordinary least squares regression, measuring the probability of 
default as shown in the following linear probability model: 
 
 
(Equation 1) 
 
where Defaulti is an indicator variable that takes values 0 (repay) or 1 
(default). Y is a vector of collateral categories (the category of 
camera equipment is omitted), X is a vector of demographic 
categories, c is a constant term, t represents month and year 
dummies, and i is the error term. We cluster the standard errors at 
the individual level and then in other regressions, at the store level 
where appropriate. Results are shown in Table 4. 
   
                                                            
22 Here, as we cannot directly test for it, we abstract from any adverse 
selection in this market, such as borrowers having more information about 
their own default risks than the lender has. But we do not doubt 
asymmetries in information could be important here, as has been 
documented in the payday loan and subprime auto lending market. See 
Adams, Einav & Levin, supra note 8, at 75 (finding that adverse selection 
arises from asymmetric information about default risk in auto loan markets); 
Dobbie & Skiba, supra note 8, at 2 (finding “economically and statistically 
significant adverse selection into payday loans”). 
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Table 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Default   
Electronics 0.021 0.0060 0.021 0.0060 
 (0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0131) 
Guns -0.041** -0.0058 -0.041** -0.0058 
 (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Household Items 0.055*** 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.041*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0155) 
Instruments -
0.055*** 
-0.038** -
0.055*** 
-0.038** 
 (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0186) (0.0166) 
Jewelry -0.028** -0.046*** -0.028* -0.046*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0146) (0.0132) 
Tools 0.031** 0.036** 0.031** 0.036** 
 (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0144) 
Female  0.054***  0.054*** 
  (0.0054)  (0.0044) 
White  -0.033  -0.033 
  (0.0237)  (0.0223) 
Black  0.00053  0.00053 
  (0.0240)  (0.0220) 
Hispanic  0.015  0.015 
  (0.0230)  (0.0221) 
Loan Amount  -
0.00023*** 
 -
0.00023**
* 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Month x Year Effects  X  X 
Cluster at Individual X   X 
Cluster at Store  X X  
N 387,223 387,223 387,223 387,223 
adj. R-sq 0.0032 0.0169 0.0032 0.0169 
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The category of camera equipment is omitted in the 
regressions, meaning results are interpreted as differences in other 
categories of collateral relative to camera equipment. As the results 
show, even after controlling for demographic characteristics (gender 
and race) and the loan size, borrowers pawning jewelry and 
instruments are the least likely to default. The pawning of household 
items or tools is more likely to result in default than pawning camera 
equipment. The coefficients on the merchandise categories are all 
statistically significantly different from each other at the 1% level, 
except for the coefficients on jewelry and instruments, which are 
statistically different at the 5% level. An interesting fact that we are 
not able to explore further here is that, controlling for loan 
characteristics, female borrowers are 5.4 percentage points more 
likely to default on their loans than male borrowers are. 
Our findings show that when borrowers use items like 
jewelry or instruments—which may have intrinsic value greater than 
the market price—as collateral for a loan, they are more likely to 
repay the loan.23 This is true even controlling for characteristics of 
the loan and borrower, and the value of the item. To investigate this 
result further, we narrow the field of jewelry down further to include 
only items that are the most likely to hold sentimental value: class 
rings, wedding rings, and engagement rings.  
Borrowers may choose to pawn these types of items as a 
commitment mechanism to encourage themselves to repay the loan, 
as we discuss further in the section on theoretical underpinnings 
below. Alternatively, these items might be the only pledge available 
to the borrower at the time they want to borrow, but given that 
pawnshops accept nearly any type of collateral, we find this 
explanation unlikely. We examine the probability of repayment for 
“sentimental” and “non-sentimental” items, counting wedding rings, 
                                                            
23 Interestingly, in the context of default on credit in Mexico, Professor 
Vissing-Jorgenson finds that when borrowers are using credit to buy luxury 
items, they are more likely to default on their loans. Annette Vissing-
Jorgenson, Consumer Credit: Learning Your Customer’s Default Risk from 
What (S)he Buys 27 (Apr. 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023238 (“I showed 
that high loss products tend to be luxuries and that consumers who tend to 
spend a lot on luxuries given their income on average are higher risk.”). 
This result indicates that credit providers may want to modify payments, 
interest rates, or both based on the items borrowers have purchased 
previously and the corresponding implications such items have about their 
credit risk. 
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class rings, engagement rings, and “mother’s” rings as sentimental 
items. As shown in Figure 3, when borrowers pawn sentimental 
items, they are less likely to default and are more likely to repay their 
loans.24 
 We test the effects of sentimentality using regression 
analysis. Here, we regress the probability of default on the amount 
loaned, an indicator for each merchandise category, and month-year 
dummies (as in Equation 1). The results from this regression are 
presented in Table 5. Even when controlling for merchandise 
categories, gender, race, and loan amount, pawning a sentimental 
item decreases the probability of default by a significant amount: 6.2 
percentage points. The statistical significance on the collateral 
categories and gender remain the same and the coefficients are 
similar. Pledging a specific item, for example a sentimental ring, 
further reduces the probability that the borrower defaults on the loan. 
In the next section, we discuss the economic theory behind our 
results.   
                                                            
24 Of course, pawnshops are popularly considered fences for stolen items 
and we cannot be certain of each pledge’s ownership. Some evidence 
suggests that only a small fraction of pawned items are repossessed by law 
enforcement because they were stolen. See CASKEY, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
However, Professor Miles finds evidence suggesting pawnshops do 
sometimes function as fences for stolen goods. Thomas J. Miles, Markets 
for Stolen Property: Pawnshops and Crime 6 (Jan. 24, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript presented at the University of Michigan Law School Law and 
Economics Workshop), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
centersandprograms/lawandeconomics/workshops/Documents/Winter2008/
miles.pdf. Further, because pawnshop borrowers must show a valid photo 
ID that is recorded with the pawnslip (and serial number of the pledge 
where possible), and pawnshops are required to regularly send all pawnslips 
to local police (usually every week), we feel confident that the vast majority 
of items pawned are pawned by their rightful owner. John P. Caskey, 
Pawnbroking in America: The Economics of a Forgotten Credit Market, 23 
J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 85, 89 n.6 (1991) (“Given the police 
report requirement, they also say it would not be in the interest of a thief to 
pawn a stolen good.”). 
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Table 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Default    
Sentimental -0.090*** -0.062*** -
0.090*** 
-0.062*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Electronics  0.0064  0.0064 
  (0.0131)  (0.0132) 
Guns  -0.0067  -0.0067 
  (0.0159)  (0.0158) 
Household Items  0.041***  0.041*** 
  (0.0155)  (0.0154) 
Instruments  -0.038**  -0.038** 
  (0.0166)  (0.0177) 
Jewelry  -0.038***  -0.038*** 
  (0.0132)  (0.0136) 
Tools  0.036**  0.036** 
  (0.0144)  (0.0151) 
Female  0.053***  0.053*** 
  (0.0044)  (0.0054) 
White  -0.030  -0.030 
  (0.0223)  (0.0238) 
Black  0.0010  0.0010 
  (0.0220)  (0.0241) 
Hispanic  0.015  0.015 
  (0.0221)  (0.0231) 
Loan Amount  -0.00023*** -
0.00023**
* 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Month x Year 
Fixed Effects 
 X  X 
Cluster at 
Customer 
X X   
Cluster at Store 
Level 
  X X 
N 395,032 387,223 395,032 387,223 
adj. R-sq 0.0021 0.0178 0.0021 0.0178 
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V. The Rational Economics and Behavioral Economics of 
Pawnbroking 
 
 In this section, we first evaluate our results relative to the 
standard rational framework used in economics to study choice 
involving decision-making over time.25 We then step away from the 
standard assumptions of this classical rational model to explore 
behavioral economics models of decision-making, models which 
strive to be more realistic and more representative of human 
behavior. We evaluate all of these models relative to our evidence 
above on common drivers of default in the pawnshop market. 
 
A. Rational Model with Exponential Discounting 
 
The canonical model of rational choice in economics, the 
exponential discounting model, assumes that individuals act to 
maximize a utility function.26 This utility function reflects levels of 
happiness coming from different potential choices at each point (or 
instant) in time. The utility at time t is represented as ut. Time can be 
measured in years, months, days or even at an instant. For our 
purposes, days are a natural way to think about time units. We can 
represent any day’s utility in this way, for an indefinite number of 
periods t. Individuals make choices by trading off these utilities over 
time. For example, an individual decides when to do her homework 
by comparing the utility of doing it today (time t) with the utility of 
doing it on any possible future date (so long as it meets certain 
constraints, like completing the homework assignment before the due 
date). Certain time periods may come with an extra cost: Doing 
homework on Friday night may come with extra disutility of missing 
a night out on the town with friends. These choices regarding how 
                                                            
25 For a nice review of both the historical and more recent theory in 
psychology and economics on intertemporal choice, see generally Shane 
Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and 
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 351 
(2002). 
26 For the original foundations of this model see Paul Samuelson, A Note on 
Measurement of Utility, 4 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 155, 156 (1937) (“During 
any specified period of time, the individual behaves so as to maximise the 
sum of all future utilities, they being reduced to comparable magnitudes by 
suitable time discounting.”). For a review of work on discounted utility 
theory since then, see Frederick et al., supra note 25, at 356–360. 
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utility is traded off depend not just on such opportunity costs, but 
also in part on the extent to which borrowers discount future utilities.  
A feature of this type of discounting is that it assumes 
borrowers correctly predict their future discounting, that is, that they 
are time consistent—meaning they know the choices that will give 
them the highest utility in terms of today, and when tomorrow comes 
they make those same choices. A drawback of exponential 
discounting, however, is that this strong assumption of individuals 
exhibiting time consistency is often at odds with the way people 
make choices in reality.27 The exponential model assumes a 
consumer’s discount rate between any two periods is constant, 
whether those two periods are today and tomorrow or 365 days and 
365-plus-one days from now,28 and, further, assumes that consumers 
know the rate at which they will discount any of these periods.29 
Time consistency precludes any procrastination or self-control 
problem.  
A second drawback is how quickly utility gets discounted 
very heavily. Even for high values of the discount rate, typically 
denoted “delta” (indicating a very patient person), say 0.99, if one 
examines discounting at the daily level (which would be a reasonable 
way to consider the choices we explore here in credit markets), the 
borrower would care almost nothing about utility in one year. That 
utility would be discounted by 0.99365 which equals approximately 
0.02, implying that borrowers care about utility in one year fifty 
times less than utility today!30 For example, this consumer would be 
indifferent between receiving $10 today and $500 in a year. So 
exponential discounting may work well in theory (the time 
consistency aspect makes calculating the tradeoffs that consumers 
face very tractable) and in some contexts, but not well when shorter 
time frames are concerned. 
In light of these drawbacks, one wonders about the propriety 
of using such a model. Recall that this model, or a close cousin, 
                                                            
27 See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 125–26 (“[P]eople have self-
control problems caused by a tendency to pursue immediate gratification in 
a way that their ‘long-run selves’ do not appreciate.”). 
28 Frederick et al., supra note 25, at 358 (“Constant discounting implies that 
a person’s intertemporal preferences . . . confirm earlier preferences.”). 
29 Id. at 367. 
30 This is because 1/.02 = 50. 
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underlies just about all models of rational choice in economics.31 
Like all models, exponential discounting is a simplification of the 
real world, and, though not always realistic in its predictions about 
behavior, it can be a nice starting point for thinking about choices 
over time.32 There is, however, overwhelming evidence refuting the 
exponential model.33 Even Paul Samuelson himself, writing the 
canonical paper that works through the exponential discounting 
model, was forthcoming about its drawbacks and unrealistic 
predictions for behavior.34 However, economists both of his time and 
today appreciate it as an excellent starting place to begin to think 
                                                            
31 See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the 
Field, 47 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 315, 315 (2009). 
32 For reviews of the empirical evidence on time inconsistency, see id.; 
Stephan Meier & Charles D. Sprenger, Stability of Time Preferences 1–41 
(Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 4756, 2010); 
Rabin, supra note 31, at 11–46; Frederick et al., supra note 25, and 
references therein. See also Jacob Goldin, Making Decisions About the 
Future: The Discounted-Utility Model, 2 MIND MATTERS: WESLEYAN 
JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 49, 49–56 (2007) (“The many disparate factors 
that can affect one’s willingness to trade off between current and future 
satisfaction—e.g., patience or impatience, imagination of the future, 
anticipation, and memory—are summarized by a single number in the DU 
model—the discount rate[;] . . . however, factors that promote simplicity 
may be detrimental to the model’s accuracy.” ). Exponential discounting 
can include very high discount rates where consumers care very little about 
the future, but consumers’ exhibiting different short-run and long-run time 
preferences cannot be accounted for with an exponential discount rate alone. 
See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. OF 
ECON. 443, 445 (1997) (“Hyperbolic discount functions are characterized by 
a relatively high discount rate over short horizons and a relatively low 
discount rate over long horizons. This discount structure sets up a conflict 
between today’s preferences, and the preferences that will be held in the 
future.”). 
33 See DellaVigna, supra note 31, at 316–341 (“In the laboratory, 
individuals are time-inconsistent, show a concern for the welfare of others, 
and exhibit an attitude toward risk that depends on framing and reference 
point. They violate rational expectations, for example, by overestimating 
their own skills and overprojecting from the current state. They use 
heuristics to solve complex problems and are affected by transient emotions 
in their decisions.”). 
34 See Samuelson, supra note 26, at 155–61 (“Serious limitations of the . . . 
analysis . . . almost certainly vitiate it even from a theoretical point of 
view.”). 
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about tradeoffs over time. Recent alternatives do a good job of 
capturing more realistic factors that affect individuals’ tradeoffs over 
time, such as self-control problems, procrastination, and a 
combination of long-run patience with short-run impatience. None of 
these factors fit neatly into exponential discounting. 
Returning to the pawnshop context, what does exponential 
discounting imply given our data? To fit into the rational choice 
model, a borrower must experience additional disutility from having 
pawned an item of sentimental value, as the sentimental value 
increases the utility the borrower garners from having the item in her 
possession. The borrower is then more likely to repay the loan in 
order to prevent this additional disutility from extending longer—and 
even becoming permanent—if she defaults on the loan. Given this 
additional disutility, it is not clear why the borrower would then 
choose to pawn an item with sentimental value, assuming the 
borrower has other alternatives. Using a sentimental item as a 
commitment mechanism to repay the loan (as we discuss next), 
therefore, may be a better explanation for why borrowers pawn items 
with sentimental value and are more likely to repay them. 
 
B. Self-control Model 
 
The simplest and most popular alternative to the classic 
exponential discounting model of choice over time shares most of the 
original model’s features. It merely relaxes the assumption about 
how individuals discount future periods. This simple permutation 
allows the model to capture elements such as procrastination, self-
control, and even addiction.35 This model is known as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting36 and adds an additional discount factor, β, to 
capture short-run time preferences. Having two discount rates in the 
model (beta and delta) reflects the idea that people have higher 
discount rates between two periods in the short-run (say, today and 
tomorrow) than between two periods in the long run (two 
consecutive days next year). Large amounts of evidence support the 
                                                            
35 For an analysis of addiction, hyperbolic discounting, and smokers, see 
generally Jonathan Gruber & Botond Kőszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? 
Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. OF ECON. 1261 (2001). 
36 Note that “quasi” here refers to the fact that we are not using continuous 
time as in pure hyperbolic discounting, but discrete time units—a more 
plausible and tractable way to capture decisions over periods such as hours 
or days. See Laibson, supra note 32, at 450. 
212 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIALLAW Vol. 32 
 
 
theoretical validity of hyperbolic discounting in consumer finance as 
well as other fields. Behaviors like simultaneously saving for 
retirement and borrowing on credit cards are accurately captured by 
this model.37 
Hyperbolic discounters can be either naive or sophisticated 
about their self-control problems.38 “Naïfs” fail to realize that they 
will have different discount rates in the short and long-runs and 
expect to be more patient in the future than they end up being 
(demonstrating a form of irrational behavior: time inconsistency). 
“Sophisticates,” on the other hand, realize they will have differing 
discount rates in the short-run and long-run and may seek 
commitment devices to combat their procrastination.39 
                                                            
37 See, e.g., Bhutta, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 8, at 14 (finding 
hyperbolic discounting present in payday loan context); Kristopher Gerardi 
et al., Financial Literacy and Subprime Mortgage Delinquency 14 (Apr. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600905 (applying a discount 
factor to measure time and risk preferences among subprime mortgage 
borrowers); David Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, A Debt 
Puzzle 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7879, 
2000); Sera Linardi & Tomomi Tanaka, Competition as a Savings 
Incentive: A Field Experiment at a Homeless Shelter 10–11 (U. of 
Pittsburgh, Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 484, 2012) (demonstrating 
how time discounting affects saving habits of individuals staying at a 
homeless shelter); Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Present-Biased 
Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing, 2 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 
193, 193 (2010). See generally DellaVigna, supra note 32. Of course, 
hyperbolic discounting, while it improves on the realism of exponential 
discounting, is also a very stylized theory of decision-making and can fail to 
capture many critical factors of decision making. 
38 See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 126 (“Two extreme 
assumptions have appeared in the literature: sophisticated people are fully 
aware of their future self-control problems and therefore correctly predict 
how their future selves will behave, and naïve people are fully unaware of 
their future self-control problems and therefore believe their future selves 
will behave exactly as they currently would like them to behave.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
39 The classic example of a commitment device was when, in Homer’s 
Odyssey, Odysseus asked his crew to tie him to the mast of his ship to help 
himself avoid jumping into the dangerous waters when he was tempted by 
the call of beautiful sirens ashore. See JOHN MALCOLM DOWLING &YAP 
CHIN-FANG, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN BEHAVORIAL ECONOMICS 90 
(2007) (“Tying oneself to the mast such as Ulysses is an example of 
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Turning back to our analysis of pawnshop borrowers, our 
results appear to be consistent with sophisticated hyperbolic 
discounting. The differing repayment rates for sentimental items and 
non-sentimental items with a similar objective value do not seem to 
fit into a model of exponential discounting, which would assume that 
the simple cost of replacing a collateralized item (be it a TV or 
wedding ring) should in large part determine repayment rates. 
However, were borrowers to have especially high affection or 
sentimentality for a particular item, they may also be more likely to 
redeem that item, regardless of the item’s replacement cost and 
relative consumption value (that is, how much utility they receive 
from using it). 
Classically, under exponential discounting, a loan 
collateralized with a $100 TV and a loan collateralized with a $100 
wedding ring would not necessarily have different repayment rates. 
Sentimental items (like the wedding ring) seem to work as a natural 
commitment device: the idea of losing an important item helps 
motivate the borrower to repay. Our results, which show that 
borrowers are more likely to make good on pawnshop loans that are 
secured by sentimental items, are consistent with the idea that 
borrowers are sophisticated about their future discounting and choose 
pledges to help them repay their loan, just like Odysseus tying 
himself to the mast.40 
Here, we cannot precisely determine whether borrowers’ 
discount rates and predictions about those rates, or, alternatively, a 
                                                                                                                              
external commitment . . . .”). More recently, websites like stickK.com offer 
commitment devices, as does “Clocky” (an alarm clock on wheels). See 
STICKK, http://www.stickk.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2012); Clocky, 
NANDA HOME, http://www.nandahome.com/products/clocky/ (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2012). Naïfs (and sophisticates) can of course be partially or fully 
naive. For simplicity, we limit our analysis to the extreme cases here. But 
see O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 122 (“Economists have been 
predisposed to focus on complete sophistication; but since our results show 
that any degree of naïveté can yield different predictions than complete 
sophistication, our analysis suggests that restricting attention to complete 
sophistication could be a methodological and empirical mistake even if 
people are mostly sophisticated.” (emphasis in original)). For a review of 
the evidence on commitment devices, see DellaVigna, supra note 32, at 
318–24. 
40 See DOWLING & CHIN-FANG, supra note 39, at 90. 
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rational form of sentimentality or affect,41 is driving the pattern we 
see in repayment behavior. Further, heterogeneity among borrowers 
is impossible for us to parse out with our existing data. Borrowers 
may be a mix of naïfs, sophisticates, and rational actors, and each 
type of borrower may choose to pawn different items. 
 
C. Loss Aversion 
 
Alternatively, or in addition, loss aversion,42 another popular 
and robust behavioral anomaly, may be responsible for high 
repayment rates when sentimental items are involved. A model that 
                                                            
41 Note that, classically, feelings like sentimentality and affection are 
outside a rational model. But modern models of choice do often allow for 
choice involving some emotional component. For more on adding affect 
into decision making, see Mark J. Browne, Christian Knoller & Andreas 
Richter, Behavorial Bias, Market Intermediaries and the Demand for 
Bicycle and Flood Insurance 18 (Munich Risk and Ins. Ctr., Working Paper 
No. 10, 2012) (“[P]eople are more willing to purchase insurance for an 
object, the more affection they have for the object.”). 
42 Loss aversion has been documented extensively and popularly in the class 
mugs experiment, Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. OF POL. ECON. 1325, 1342 
(1990) (finding that “the value that an individual assigns to such objects as 
mugs, pens, binoculars, and chocolate bars appears to increase substantially 
as soon as that individual is given the object”), although there has been 
considerable work on the topic since then. We do not actually have many 
people pawning mugs in our data. More recently, loss aversion has been 
documented outside the lab among cab drivers. See Colin Camerer et al., 
Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time, 112 Q.J. OF 
ECON. 407, 408 (1997) (finding negative wage elasticities reflecting that 
“drivers tend to quit early on high wage days and to drive longer hours on 
low wage days”); accord Ernst Fehr & Lorenz Goette, Do Workers Work 
More if Wages are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiement, 
97 AM. ECON. R. 298, 300 (2007) (documenting loss aversion among bike 
messengers). For a helpful review of this empirical literature, see generally 
Lorenz Goette et al., Loss Aversion and Labour Supply, 2 J. OF THE EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N 216 (2004). For modeling specifics, see David Bowman, 
Deborah Minehart & Matthew Rabin, Loss Aversion in a Consumption-
Savings Model, 38 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 155, 156–64 (1999) and 
Botond Kőszegi & Matthew Rabin, A Model of Reference-Dependent 
Preferences, 121 Q.J. OF ECON. 1133, 1137–1155 (2006). See DellaVigna, 
supra note 32, 325–30; and Bowman, supra, at 164–67, for a review of the 
literature. 
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includes loss aversion (or the “endowment effect,”43 a closely related 
concept) typically focuses on a decision at one point in time and 
abstracts from discounting over time, as with the models above.44 
Also, as in the other models, borrowers maximize a utility function 
but with loss aversion affecting choices. Loss aversion is the effect 
whereby losses (relative to some reference point) “loom larger”45 
than gains. For example, the utility loss associated with losing $10 is 
larger than the utility gain of winning $10. Typically, this gap is 
measured to be about two, meaning losing $10 feels about twice as 
bad as winning $10 feels good.46 
Recent evidence suggests different types of items are more 
likely to be subject to loss aversion than others. 47 Given this existing 
empirical evidence, we would predict that sentimental items are 
subject to loss aversion to a greater extent than items with pure 
consumption value (that is, those items providing utility solely based 
on the use derived from it, like watching a TV or printing documents 
with a printer). Therefore, in our context, a model of loss aversion in 
decision-making with respect to pawn contracts implies higher 
repayment rates for items that people feel loss averse towards. 
Reclaiming an item allows the borrower to avoid that extra negative 
utility associated with losing an item (beyond the normal utility loss 
associated with forgoing the consumption value of the item). Loss 
aversion is an intuitive and likely important component of borrower 
behavior in the pawnshop context. 
The extent to which loss aversion is relevant in 
pawnbroking, however, turns on the relevant reference point, which 
we are unfortunately unable to determine in our data. Reference 
points are some neutral point around which choices are framed by 
the decision maker. A natural reference point and the one that is most 
often assumed in behavioral economic models is the status quo, i.e., 
                                                            
43 See Kahneman et al., supra note 42, at 1326 (“[T]he increased value of a 
good to an individual when the good becomes part of the individual’s 
endowment [is] the ‘endowment effect.’”). 
44 See id. 
45 See Dan Ariely, Joel Huber & Klaus Wertenbroch, When Do Losses 
Loom Larger than Gains?, 42 J. OF MARKETING RES. 134, 134–138 (2005). 
46 See Camerer et al., supra note 42, at 411–12, for a review of the evidence 
on the coefficient of loss aversion.  
47 For more on what people are loss averse about and when, see generally 
George F. Loewenstein, Christopher K. Hsee, Elke U. Weber & Ned Welch, 
Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001); Sarah F. Brosnan et al., 
Endowment Effects in Chimpanzees, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1704 (2007). 
216 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIALLAW Vol. 32 
 
 
whatever situation you are currently in: You currently either own a 
mug, or you do not own a mug. Other possibilities for reference 
points are (a) goals (I want to run a marathon under four hours.); (b) 
past experiences (I ran a marathon in under four hours when I was 
25.); (c) social comparisons (My brother ran a sub-four marathon and 
I’d like to beat him.); and (d) expectations (I can probably finish the 
marathon in four hours.). In a model that includes loss aversion, 
changes relative to the reference point result in a change in utility. 
For example, if you ran a marathon in 4:05 with a goal of breaking 
four hours, you would feel loss averse because you were below your 
reference point. However, if you ran a marathon in 4:05 with a goal 
of 4:15, you would not feel this extra disutility. The same outcome (a 
4:05 marathon) comes with different utilities depending on the 
reference point. Where pawnshop borrowers’ reference points are 
calibrated such that they expect to lose their pledge, borrowers will 
not feel this extra disutility when they default. If their reference point 
is owning and using their pledge, however, they would feel this extra 
utility loss if they default.  
The most robust model of loss-averse behavior is found in 
Professors Kőszegi and Rabin’s article entitled A Model of 
Reference-Dependent Preferences.48 Kőszegi and Rabin identify a 
specific reference point around which people feel loss averse. Their 
reference point is defined to take into account individuals’ 
expectations as well as a number of other factors. The model then 
predicts how individuals will make choices by maximizing a utility 
function that consists of two parts: a traditional, rational part; and the 
less conventional loss-averse component derived from utility gains or 
losses due to ending up above or below the reference point. 
Determining the reference point in pawnbroking could be a fruitful 
area for future research, but for now, we cannot directly test the 
extent to which people are loss averse without more direct evidence 
on the reference point. 
 
D. Discussion 
 
Using only our loan records data, we cannot fully determine 
whether pawnshop users are hyperbolic discounters, loss averse, 
fully rational, or some combination of these factors. Nevertheless, 
our results comport with the type of discounting shown among 
                                                            
48 Kőszegi & Rabin, supra note 42, at 1137. 
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sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. The data do suggest that people 
choose to pawn sentimental items. Since almost anything is accepted 
by pawnbrokers, why pawn your wedding ring? We view such 
behavior as suggestive evidence that borrowers exploit sentimental 
items to combat their (accurate) prediction that they may not have 
the self-control to pay back their loans and may be tempted to 
default. A sentimental item will be harder to replace (Try explaining 
to your wife what happened to your wedding ring!) and thus provides 
a better commitment device than a similarly valued but fungible 
item, such as tools or a TV. Additional research, perhaps 
experimental in nature, is needed on this topic to fully disentangle 
which kind of borrowers pawnshop users are. 
  
VI.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we use transaction data to study the behavior of 
customers patronizing pawnshops. We present new evidence on the 
dynamics of repayment and default for loans secured by different 
types of collateral at pawnshops. We are the first, to our knowledge, 
to study borrower activity in the world of pawnbroking from a 
behavioral economics perspective. 
We view pawnshops as a potentially attractive alternative to 
other forms of high interest credit.49 Pawnshops offer simple 
transactions in which anyone can participate. No credit is needed and 
no credit check is conducted.50 Interest rates on pawnshop loans are 
lower than those associated with many other types of credit, even 
mainstream credit. The combination of the existing regulations on 
interest rates and what appears to be consumers’ self-governing 
repayment behavior or “self-regulation” seems to work well in this 
market.  
While we cannot say for sure what behavioral factors are at 
play, repayment rates on pawnshop loans, particularly those secured 
by sentimental items, are high. Some combination of sentimentality, 
loss aversion, and discounting seems to help borrowers make good 
on their pledges. A deeper welfare analysis is difficult for us to 
                                                            
49 A main alternative is payday loans. For an overview of payday loans and 
their consequences, see generally Melzer, supra note 8; Adair Morse, 
Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villans?, 102 J. OF FINANCIAL ECON. 28 (2011); 
Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 8. Craigslist is a natural alternative to 
pawnshops, but we know of no research on this market. 
50 See Caskey, supra note 24, at 90 
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conduct without additional data, but we are convinced that 
pawnshops can be a good alternative source of credit.51 Further 
research on pawnbroking and its customers will give policymakers, 
consumers, and academics a better grasp of this ancient and yet still 
popular and important institution. 
 
Figure 1: Collateral by Category, Number of Observations 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of loans taken out using each category of 
collateral between 1997 and 2002 in a sample of observations from a 
pawnshop lender in Texas.  
 
                                                            
51 See Bos, Carter & Skiba, supra note 3, at 1 (“[P]eople who are excluded 
from the credit supplied through the regular banking system have to rely on 
alternative financial services like those supplied by the pawnbroking 
industry.”). 
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Figure 2: Probability of Default by Collateral Category 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of loans in each collateral category where the 
borrowers defaulted or picked up the loan. The sample of observations is 
from a pawnshop lender in Texas between 1997 and 2002.  
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Figure 3: Default Rates on Sentimental Items 
 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts the fraction of pawnshop loans that borrowers default on 
when the loans are collateralized with items that are sentimental and when 
they are collateralized with items that are non-sentimental. Sentimental 
items include wedding rings, engagement rings, class rings, and “mother’s 
rings.” The sample of observations is from a pawnshop lender in Texas 
between 1997 and 2002.  
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